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Abstract—The Internet presents a problem for the
protection of intellectual property. Those who cre-
ate content must be adequately compensated for the
use of their works. Rights agencies who monitor the
use of these works exist in many juristictions. In the
traditional broadcast environment this monitoring is
a diﬃcult task. With Internet Protocol Television
(IPTV) and Next Generation Networks (NGN) this
situation is further complicated.
In this work we focus on Digitally Watermarking next
generation media broadcasts. We present a frame-
work which provides the ability to monitor media
broadcasts that also utilises a Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) and Digital Certiﬁcates. Furthermore, the
concept of an independent monitoring agency, that
would operate the framework and act as an arbiter,
is introduced. We evaluate appropriate short signa-
ture schemes, suitable Watermarking algorithms and
Watermark robustness. Finally, the application of the
proposed framework in other related scenarios is dis-
cussed.
Keywords: Next Generation Networks, broadcast mon-
itoring, public key watermarking, IPTV, PKI, short
signature
1 Introduction
The global acceptance of revolutionary services, such as
IPTV [1] and NGN [2], is in the state of growth and
impels broadcasters and media creators to evolve their
existing infrastructures and services. IPTV, for instance,
shows the potential to bring interactive content to the
masses. Consumer applications such as interactive TV
(iTV) [1] changes the modality of the TV set from being
the source of one-way passive entertainment to a two-way
interactive entertainment and communications model.
With the transition to digital media streams received over
the Internet, new challenges loom. Today, the practices
of recording, distribution and copying multimedia con-
tent is easy and straightforward [3]. Due to these facts,
it is more and more diﬃcult to enforce copyright and to
safeguard intellectual property for broadcast media.
Digital Watermarking [4], which may be considered a
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form of steganography [5], attempts to address this prob-
lem by embedding information within the digital signal.
The primary use of Watermarking is on digital signals
that encode audio, image or video content. However,
Digital Watermarking may be used for a wide range of
applications such as copyright protection [6], ﬁngerprint-
ing [7], broadcast monitoring, advertising monitoring [8]
and communication over covert channels [9]. It is debat-
able whether traditional Watermarking systems, which
are based on disclosure of the key needed to embed and to
detect the Watermark are generally suitable for proving
ownership or authentication. Therefore, we established a
framework based on asymmetric public-key cryptography
which is used for exhaustive authentication with the help
of Blind Watermarking techniques.
In addition to the traditional analogue, and newer digi-
tal, radio and television transmission means, programme
broadcasts may also be received over the Internet. The
broadcaster (BC) is an entity which broadcasts content
for general consumption over their assigned channels, for
instance an IP network (IPTV). In many jurisdictions
broadcasters have regulatory obligations which attempt
to protect the intellectual property [5] and copyrights of
authors, songwriters, performers, actors, publishers, etc.
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions there exists bodies
charged with the defense of the rights of intellectual prop-
erty and copyright holders and the calculation, charg-
ing and collection of performance royalties on the use of
these protected works. Currently, there are several cases
in which broadcasters cannot conﬁdentially conﬁrm that
their royalties liabilities are correctly calculated. This is
because they currently do not employ a viable automated
system to measure what protected works are broadcasted,
how often and when. Therefore a gap has opened up in
t h ea c t u a la m o u n tc h a r g e db yt h er i g h t sb o d i e sa n dt h e
correct payable royalties liability of the broadcaster.
This paper focuses on methods and procedures to close
this gap and to support means for obtaining more de-
tailed information about streamed content. A framework
for authentication based on PKI for the parties involved
is introduced, as is a framework for Watermarking rich
media content. The main objective of these frameworks
is to provide the ability to the broadcaster to be able
to prove the amount of streamed media actually used
to the agency responsible for monitoring broadcasters.
This agency is called the monitoring agency (MA) and ischarged with supervising broadcasting stations for pur-
poses of calculating the royalties to be paid by broad-
casters to the rights body. Monitoring agencies are often
instructed by a rights entity (EX), which is a competent
organisation charged with protecting the rights of intel-
lectual property and copyright holders, and negotiating
recompensation for the exploitation of these works.
However, this framework is in the interest of each in-
volved party and attempts to address the needs of all
parties. The broadcaster can be sure that it is being
charged fairly. The monitoring agency can oﬀer services
and get paid for doing so. The rights entity can perhaps
calculate that a broadcaster should pay more, or less,
royalties than they are actually paying. For each party a
substantial advantage can be seen by implementing such
af r a m e w o r k .
Figure 1: General Framework Overview
2 Framework Overview
A general overview of the framework with its three parties
can be seen in Figure 1. It makes use of two additional
frameworks, the PKI and the Watermarking Framework.
The PKI Framework (section 4), is used for establishing
a trust network between all of the involved entities. It
makes use of a root Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) in which
each participating entity must trust.
In order to establish a working PKI, each of the parties
has to process one or more protocol steps. The PKI es-
tablishment has the purpose of distributing authenticated
private and public keys utilising Digital Certiﬁcates. To
start the process of monitoring, a ”Request for Monitor-
ing” is sent to the monitoring agency. Afterwards, broad-
caster selects a piece of content which he wants to stream
and computes the corresponding hash table. This hash
table is carried over a secure and authenticated channel
to the MA as well as to the EX. Subsequently, the broad-
caster initiates the process deﬁned by the Watermarking
Framework.
The Watermarking Framework (see section 5) speciﬁes
procedures for Watermark embedding, retrieval and ver-
iﬁcation of Watermarks in media streams. The broad-
caster will sign the stream which is about to be broad-
casted with his private key. Then the corresponding sig-
nature is embedded into the media stream with a known
Watermarking technique. Further on in the process, the
monitoring agency will extract the Watermark and ver-
ify the signature. Therefore, the agency may be sure that
only the original broadcaster broadcasted the media con-
tent, due to the fact that additional security metadata,
such as timestamps and identiﬁers, are used. Addition-
ally, EX can also verify the signature in order to prevent
abuse by the MA.
The objective of the whole framework is to let the broad-
caster mark the ﬁle stream uniquely but also provides
the monitoring agency with the possibility to identify
the broadcast stream and therefore the corresponding
broadcaster. In this paper we focus on the novel IPTV
broadcasting infrastructure [2]. However, our framework
should be applicable to any broadcasting infrastructure
irrespective of the underlying distribution network.
3 IPTV Overview
IPTV is a new method of delivering digital video and
audio content across IP networks [10]. Today, the in-
dustry is going through a profound transition, migrat-
ing from conventional TV to the era of digital technol-
ogy. IPTV technology provides several advantages but
service providers face a set of speciﬁc barriers, namely
the availability of suﬃcient network capacity, especially
in the last-mile or local loop section of the broadband net-
work that lies between core telecommunications network,
or back-haul trunks, and the end-user. There are cur-
rently six principal types of broadband access networks
which have suﬃcient capacity and scalably to meet the
bandwidth requirements of IPTV:
• Optical Fibre
• Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)
• Cable TV
• Satellite Broadband
• Fixed Wireless Broadband
• 3G Mobile Data Networks
Several diﬀerent applications can be provided by IPTV
service providers over a broadband connection, however
the two key IPTV applications typically deployed by ser-
vice providers are broadcast digital TV and content on
demand (CoD). In this paper we only focus on digital TV
broadcast.Security is the number one priority for IPTV service
providers because video content producers are reluctant
to grant license rights to distribute premium content over
digital networks unless there are eﬀective mechanisms in
place, which will secure that content. There are a num-
ber of IPTV content protection schemes available on the
market. These protection schemes fall into two broad
categories: Conditional Access (CA) and Digital Rights
Management (DRM) environments. The CA system is
primarily responsible for ensuring unauthorised access of
the IPTV service, while the DRM system enforces con-
tent owners business models and granted usage rights.
4 PKI Framework
Trust forms the basis of all communication, be it phys-
ical or electronic. In the case of electronic communica-
tion, building trust is quite diﬃcult as the identity of the
other entity remains concealed. In our speciﬁc case, trust
is also the foundation for the calculation and collection of
royalties. The three entities, the rights entity, the broad-
caster and the monitoring agency, need to trust the CA.
Therefore, a PKI needs to be established which provides
procedures to generate, distribute, and utilise keys and
Certiﬁcates and so helps to build up a trust relationship.
We propose a single-CA architecture which makes use
of a superior independent Certiﬁcate Authority. The CA
m u s tn o tb ei n v o l v e do ri n t e g r a t e di nm e t e r i n ga n ds h o u l d
be independent and impartial. Within the single-CA ar-
chitecture, all entities trust the CA and therefore can
validate and verify each others Certiﬁcates and then com-
municate. In later communications, the CA need not be
involved.
After a successful PKI-establishment, the broadcasting
entity could sign a message and send it to the monitor-
ing agency or indeed to the rights entity and both entities
could be assured, that the message was sent by the broad-
caster.
5 Watermarking Framework
The Watermarking Framework speciﬁes the communica-
tion protocol between the broadcaster and the monitoring
agency in which the rights entity is not involved. Further-
more, the Watermarking Framework provides a detailed
insight into procedures for creating, detecting, extracting
and verifying the Watermark.
5.1 Overview
The chief characteristic of a traditional Watermarking
scheme for copyright protection, or DRM, is that the Wa-
termark cannot be separated from the medium without
knowledge of a secret value. We, in our speciﬁc case, tar-
get on another characteristic: sender authentication. It
should be possible to identify the broadcasting station
unambiguously and show exactly who broadcast what
stream and when.
Therefore, our Watermark information contains a dig-
ital signature issued by the broadcaster that deﬁni-
tively identiﬁes the broadcaster. Each entity that re-
ceives the broadcast stream and owns the corresponding
broadcaster Certiﬁcate, can clearly verify the distributed
stream with the help of the corresponding PK.
5.2 Signature Schemes
A principal requirement to all Watermarking systems is
the need for a small Watermark. The larger the Water-
mark, the larger are the chances for adversely aﬀecting
the quality of the streamed media. Therefore, the signa-
ture scheme output has to be as small [11] as is possible
to be able to embed the Watermark as often as possible
and to be repeated multiple times throughout the stream.
While the typical RSA 1024-bit signature output is large,
several alternative schemes were researched.
The Nyberg-Rueppel ([12], hereafter NR) signature
scheme focuses on the size of the input and output and is
a DSA-like signature with message recovery. The draw-
back of this signature type, the ﬁxed length of input, is
not given in our case because the message m (see (1)),
which is used for exact identiﬁcation of the stream, is
always brought to a ﬁxed length through a given hash
function. NR is perfectly suited to messages shorter than
ten bytes but leaves the question of dealing with short
messages, of say ﬁfteen bytes, unanswered. In our speciﬁc
case, the hash to be signed is exactly 10 bytes long and
brings only a marginal risk of collision. Message recov-
ery [13], another characteristic of NR signatures, provides
means so that the original message can be extracted out
of the signature.
5.2.1 Short Hash Methods
Hash functions are often used in digital signature algo-
rithms. The message m that is about to be hashed, in our
case, consists of an identiﬁer string ID-str concatenated
with an ID number ID-num and an unique times-tamp
ID-time:
m = ID-str || ID-num || ID-time (1)
The ID-str could be represented through the name of the
media content, for instance. The ID-num could be an
identiﬁcation number. The ID-time is a unique time-
stamp which prevents replay-attacks. This means, that
an adversary may not record the stream and broadcast it
later again on an authorised channel which is also moni-
tored.5.2.2 Hash Table for Veriﬁcation Purposes
A hash table ht in our speciﬁc case is a data structure
that associates the hash value with ID-str, ID-num and
ID-time. The hash table contains several important
attributes and is essential for the veriﬁcation process by
the MA.
Transferring the hash table ht to the MA, can be
compared to the cryptographical commitment scheme,
visualized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secure and Authentic Hash Table Distri-
bution
Summary: during the commitment phase, the hash ta-
ble is transferred to MA and EX. During the opening
phase, BC proves to MA and EX that he is broadcasting
one of the items in the hash table.
1. commitment phase:
1. BC −→ MA: encPK MA(signSKBC(ht))
2. MA −→ EX: encPK EX(signSKBC(ht))
2. opening phase:
1. BC −→ MA: watermark(signSKBC(hs))
2. MA: extract signature from stream
with the help of beacon
3. MA −→ EX: encPK EX(signSKBC(hs))
T h ep r o v e r ,r e s p e c t i v e l yt h eB C ,s e n d st h e” c o m m i t -
m e n t ”i nf o r mo ft h eh a s ht a b l eht to the veriﬁer (the
MA). MA will forward the signed hash table to the rights
entity but encrypts it with the corresponding PKEX in
order to guarantee secrecy which is needed to prevent
other parties from viewing the hash table. This can be
seen as the commitment phase and takes place directly af-
ter having chosen the ﬁle to be streamed. The encryption
is necessary due to the possibility that the hash table of
a potential business rival might be seen by another party.
Later, after broadcasting the media content, the veriﬁer
can scrutinise, with the help of the message recovery char-
acteristic of the signature, whether the BC broadcast the
content correctly or not (opening phase).
5.2.3 Case Study: Video Broadcaster
The Internet Movie Database (IMDB) 1 published inter-
faces for several systems to access the IMDB locally. For
1http://www.imdb.com
our case study, we downloaded the complete IMDB title
textﬁle which contains currently 1.206.730 diﬀerent movie
titles. We used the movie title as a ID-str and created
a unique number used as the ID-num. The time-stamp
ID-time was the current date parceled as a unixtimes-
tamp. An example assignment between unixtimestamp
and normal time can be seen in (2).
05/07/1982@00 : 00 =⇒ 389592000 (2)
For instance, in our simulation, m looked like this:
m= T i t l eA    || 23754    || 534056   
ID-str ID-num ID-time
(3)
We created 1,206,730 diﬀerent messages m and subse-
quently hashed them with MD5 and SHA-1. Afterwards,
we extracted the ﬁrst 10 bytes which satisfy the ﬁrst 20
characters of the output HEX value. No collisions were
detected for both hash functions, MD5 and SHA-1, even
with only using the ﬁrst 10 bytes of the hash-sum.
hs =[ 0 ...9]hash(m)( 4 )
Finally, a theoretical possibility to create a 2nd-preimage
attack on our used short hash methods remains. Because
of the reduced length of the hash value, our methods
don’t have the complete potential strength of 2160 (SHA-
1) respectively 2128 (MD5) 2nd-preimage resistance. The
search space would be reduced to 280 respectively accord-
ing to the birthday paradox on 240.
5.3 Suitable Watermarking Algorithms
In our speciﬁc case, the Watermark should have special
control characteristics which are required to guarantee
the ability to verify the embedded signature by the mon-
itoring agency.
Spread-spectrum [14] technologies establish secrecy of
communication by performing modulation according to
a secret key in the channel encoder and decoder. Our
speciﬁc scenario does not focus on secrecy but on au-
thentication. Therefore, the beacon used for encoding
and decoding, only contains the information how to pro-
cess these steps. The beacon is not a secret value.
5.3.1 Proposed Watermarking Algorithm
Basically, a Watermarking system for our purposes can be
described by a tuple  O,S,W,H,P,G,C S,E H,D H,V P 
where O is the set of all original data, a video stream
for instance. The set S contains all secret keys needed
for creating an unforgeable signature. W represents the
set of all Watermarks (signatures, in our case) and H theset of all beacons. Beacons in our scenario are markers
that signify the presence and start of a Watermark bit
sequence in the signal. The beacon substitutes the key
in normal Watermarking systems. P describes the set of
public keys which are needed to verify the signature and
G represents the set of Certiﬁcates issued by the CA.
Four functions are described as followed:
CS : O×S− →O (5)
EH : O×S×W×H− →O (6)
DH : O×H− →W (7)
VP : W×P×G− →{ 1,0} (8)
CS focuses on creating the corresponding Watermark
through a signature. EH describes the function for em-
bedding the Watermark and DH respectively the function
for extracting it. Furthermore, VP stands for the veriﬁca-
tion function needed to check if the Watermark is valid.
The Watermark w is created with
w = signSKBC(hs)( 9 )
and outputs a short bit-string which contains the signa-
ture of the reduced hash-sum. See (4) for further details
about the reduced hash-sum hs.
5.4 Embedding the Watermark
In this subsection we focus on the embedding process of
the signature/ Watermark. Hartung and Girod proposed
in 1998 [15] a method which focuses on Watermarking
MPEG-2 video data. We adopt the proposed methods
for our purposes of embedding the signature into a given
video broadcast stream. For further information, the in-
terested reader is referred to [15].
5.5 Retrieval of the Watermark
The proposed methods rely on Blind Watermarking tech-
niques and therefore do not need the original video stream
in the retrieval process. For further information, the in-
terested reader is referred to [15].
5.6 Verifying the Signature
It is possible for the monitoring agency to verify the sig-
nature which is represented by the extracted bit sequence.
The method VP veriﬁes the signature with the help of the
corresponding public key and Certiﬁcate. The used pub-
lic key for verifying is taken from the Certiﬁcate in order
to be sure, that only the public key belonging to the cor-
rect broadcaster is used.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The schemes proposed in this paper may be viewed as
attractive to both broadcasters and rights agencies. This
model provides the broadcaster and the rights entity with
an automated and trust worthy method for measuring the
exploitation of protected works. The paper introduces
the concept of an independent third party that moni-
tors and balances the interests of the broadcaster and
rights entity. We discuss the rapidly evolving technologies
Figure 2: Abstract Proposal for DRM-substituting Busi-
ness Model
and distribution models faced by the entertainment and
broadcasting sectors. Then we discuss next generation
media distribution using IPTV as an example. We evalu-
ate established short signature schemes, such as Nyberg-
Rueppel, that could be integrated into a ﬁnal system.
Our model could function as a compliment, or an alter-
native, to established DRM models.
Therefore, in Figure 2 we propose an exempliﬁed scheme
which could substitute current DRM models. If a user
wants to buy a media content (audio, video or image con-
tent) from a content distributor, the TTP handles the
whole process. The request for the speciﬁc media con-
tent gets proxied by the TTP for providing anonymity.
Afterwards, the content is Watermarked by the TTP with
a user-speciﬁc signature and sent back to the user. This
means, that the content provider will never get the knowl-
edge of the user’s secret key.
Clearly, Watermarking has a number of characteristics
that make it an ideal technology for enabling a variety
of media distribution business models. However, histori-
cally robustness has been a chief weakness of Digital Wa-
termarking techniques.
A variant of our model could be used by existing on-
line music services to modify their current DRM schemes
toward an intellectual property preserving framework
based on personalised Watermarks. Digital Watermark-
ing schemes present an alternative to regulatory mea-
sures. Although not covered in this paper, the current
body of national and European law provides legal protec-
tion for Watermarking and Digital Certiﬁcate technolo-
gies. A robust Digital Watermark can jump the analogue
hole. This might mitigate the need for Broadcast Flags,
TPM like chipsets or signal degradation on playback de-
v i c et ob em a n d a t e db yl a w .
State of the art Watermarking techniques have taken sub-
stantial steps forward in addressing the issue of robust-